Glossary
Summary. Definitions of the technical terms used in this documentation. Where a term comes from a standard, the source is given.
Overview
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| ACME | Automatic Certificate Management Environment, a protocol for automated issuance (RFC 8555) |
| Additional post-quantum secret | A secret that the key agents agree on independently of TLS and that enters every relationship connection as an external PSK |
| Agent certificate | ML-DSA certificate with which a key agent authenticates itself to the agent on the other side (RFC 9881) |
| AIA | Authority Information Access; an extension stating where the issuing CA's certificate can be retrieved (RFC 5280) |
| Alternative signature | A second signature in a certificate, per the X.509 extensions 2.5.29.72 to 2.5.29.74; here ML-DSA |
| Approval | A signature over the order hash by a person registered in the rule set |
| Attestation | Confirmation of an order by enrollment with its service key; replaces approval by a person in automatic profile classes |
| Authorization | A target application's decision whether a specific operation is allowed for a verified identity |
| CA generation | A set of CA keys and certificates with its own lifetime; a new generation supersedes the previous one |
| CDP | CRL Distribution Point; an extension stating where the CRL can be retrieved (RFC 5280) |
| Ceremony | A documented procedure with fixed roles at the offline root |
| CMP | Certificate Management Protocol; profile for devices: RFC 9483 |
| Connection rotation | Scheduled replacement of a TLS connection by a new one with a fresh secret, without interruption for the application |
| CRL | Certificate Revocation List (RFC 5280) |
| CSR | Certificate Signing Request per PKCS #10, with proof of possession |
| EST | Enrollment over Secure Transport (RFC 7030) |
| Evidence chain | Mapping of every requirement to source, target, commitment, measure, component, and verification procedure |
| External anchor | A copy of a chain head in append-only storage outside the administrators' reach |
| External PSK | A secret agreed outside TLS that enters the TLS 1.3 key schedule (RFC 8446) |
| Fail closed | Rejecting rather than accepting when status information is missing |
| HSM (hardware security module) | Hardware that generates, stores, and uses keys without releasing them |
| Hybrid | Combination of a classical and a post-quantum mechanism |
| Hybrid group | Key agreement in TLS 1.3 combining ECDHE and ML-KEM (RFC 10024) |
| Issuing CA | A CA that issues system certificates; at least one per organization or partner, with a name constraint |
| Key agent | A service on a connected host that agrees on the additional post-quantum secret with the agent on the other side |
| Key broker | A local component that hands the key agent's secret to the TLS adapter on the same host |
KeyUpdate | TLS 1.3 message for deriving new traffic keys from the current traffic secret |
| Ledger | The CA worker's append-only, chained journal of intents, issuances, rejections, revocations, and relationships |
| ML-DSA | Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (FIPS 204) |
| ML-KEM | Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (FIPS 203) |
| mTLS | TLS with mutual certificate authentication |
| Name constraint | The nameConstraints extension in a CA certificate (RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.10) |
| OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 6960); not offered by TrustBridge |
| OData | Open Data Protocol, a standard for REST interfaces (OASIS, ISO/IEC 20802) |
| Operating partner | A company that operates an installation to the agreed extent in the Managed model, without holding approvals or keys |
| Order | An immutable, byte-exact snapshot of a future certificate, revocation, or relationship; identified by the SHA-256 of its bytes |
| Organization | A party with its own hierarchy of certificate authorities, its own approvers, and its own ledger |
| Partner | An organization in the supply chain, represented technically by its issuing CA |
| Partner identity | The combination of organization, service name, and relationship of a connection, as verified by the TLS adapter |
| Partner portal | Web interface through which the people responsible at a partner with its own partner CA submit and approve requests |
| Profile class | A certificate category defined in the worker's rule set, with binding rules |
| Profile template | A template maintained in management from which an order is created |
| Projection | A copy of a ledger entry in the database, for display; not authoritative |
| Relationship policy | An organization's settings for its direction of a trust relationship: services, purpose, cryptographic requirements, duration, right to change, revocation |
| Relationship revocation | Unilateral termination of one direction of a trust relationship |
| Relying-party contract | Rules a relying party must follow for the security commitments to hold for it |
| RPO, RTO | Maximum tolerable data loss and maximum tolerable recovery time, respectively |
| Rule set | The CA worker's local configuration: CAs, profile classes, approvers, limits |
| Security commitment | A verifiable statement about the behavior of the overall system, with assumptions, verification procedure, and residual risk |
| SLH-DSA | Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (FIPS 205) |
| SPIFFE | Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone; a standard for workload identities |
| Standby | A prepared second instance that takes over on failure |
| System | A partner's host, service, or device, identified by exactly one DNS name |
| Tenant | The dividing line between organizations and partners within one installation |
| TLS adapter | A local service that opens or accepts the protected TLS connection to the other side on behalf of an existing application |
tls_cert_with_extern_psk | TLS 1.3 extension from RFC 9973: certificate authentication with an additional external PSK in the key schedule |
| Trust anchor | A certificate that a relying party trusts without further verification |
| Trust bundle | A compilation of the active relationships with their anchors and policies, signed by the CA worker |
| Trust relationship | An agreement between exactly two organizations to recognize the other side's trust anchors for specific services and purposes |
| Trusted computing base (TCB) | Components whose compromise enables unauthorized issuance or status statements |
| Visibility scope | A named set of tenants whose data a person may see |
en/wiki/pqcrypt/trustbridge/glossary.txt · Last modified: by Claude Test Contributor