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Zero Trust and private devices

graph TD
    C["Client: Access, Excel, Power BI, line-of-business app – company PC, private device, contractor"] -->|"request with sign-in"| S["Signals: origin, country, sign-in method, person, key, second factor"]
    S --> R["Sign-in policy: deny, require a code, or nothing"]
    R --> A["Rights: alias, object, verb, read-only; restrictions of the key"]
    A --> D[("Database: views and procedures for rows and columns")]
    R --> L["Records: sign-in event, audit, findings, change log"]
    A --> L

Figure: Every request runs through the same chain. The operator sets policy and rights; the service enforces them on every request and records what it decided.

The data service doesn't set business policy. Whether a private laptop may see customer data, whether an employee works from abroad, or whether a contractor gets two weeks of access is the operator's decision. The service gives the operator the means to configure these decisions, enforce them on every request, and prove them afterward. This page shows which signals the service has for that, how reliable they are, and where its limits are.

Key features

  • No trust from the network alone. Every request carries a sign-in; the corporate network can spare a code but never replaces a sign-in.
  • Access per person and purpose. A person has several personal keys, one per device or purpose, each restricted, time-limited, and revocable on its own.
  • Policy by situation. Sign-in rules require a second factor or deny, per sign-in method, network, country, network operator, program, time of day, person, and Windows group; exceptions can apply only until a given time.
  • Least privilege down to the object. Rules name aliases, object kinds, single objects, verbs, and read-only; the database limits rows and columns through views, under the person's login.
  • Immediate revocation. Revoked keys, disabled people, and ended sessions take effect with the next request.
  • Evidence. Sign-in events with origin and reason, an audit entry per request, findings of the sign-in rules, and a change log of every setting.

Core concepts

What the service establishes and what not

The service distinguishes three kinds of information: what it observes on its own connection, what a client merely claims, and what a trusted party confirms. In rules, claimed information can only restrict, never serve as an exception on its own.

InformationKindAs a rule conditionLimit
Network address of the request (behind a trusted proxy, the forwarded one)observedyes: networks, own networksBehind NAT or a proxy it's that device's address
Country and network operator from the addressobserved, estimatedyes: country, network operatorVPN, mobile networks, and cloud egress move the country and the network operator
Sign-in method (Windows, personal key, SQL login, service key)confirmedyes–
Person and Windows groupsconfirmedyesGroups only with Windows sign-in
Second factor (code from an authenticator app)confirmedyesProves possession of the phone, not of the device making the request
Program (User-Agent)claimedyes, to restrict; as an exception on its own it exempts anyone who sends the textExcel and Power BI Desktop send the same text; any program can pretend to be another
Time of dayobservedyes: time windowsTime zone from Gateway:SignInLog:TimeZone
Device state (managed, encrypted, antivirus current)–noThe service has no connection to device management (MDM) or endpoint protection

The service claims nothing about a device it can't check. It doesn't recognize a „private device“ as such. It can, however, distinguish how someone signs in and from where: a Windows sign-in from the corporate network almost always comes from a company PC in the domain; a personal key from the internet can come from any device. The guides below use exactly this distinction.

What the service doesn't control

  • Data on the device. Whatever a client has received stays there: in an Excel file, in Power BI's cache, in an Access database. The service doesn't control saving, copying, or printing; that's up to device management and the application.
  • The state of the phone holding the second factor. The code proves possession of the app, not that the requesting device is secure.
  • Business rules per row. Whether an agent may see a particular customer is decided by the database (view, procedure), not by a second rule system in the service; see row-level restriction.

Everyday situations

SituationMain meansGuide
Managed company PCWindows sign-in, rules by Windows group, corporate networkSet up Windows sign-in, tier access by location
Private laptopown personal key, restricted, code from outsideAdmit private devices
Employee abroadrule by country, time-limited exceptionAllow access while travelling
Agent with own deviceview per agent, rule on the view, time-limited keyRestrict agents to their customers
Excel and Power BIone key per purpose, read-only, one aliasSeparate reports from refresh
Access and VBA line-of-business apppass the person to SQL Server, own alias per applicationConnect a line-of-business application
Unknown or suspicious devicedenial by origin, code, findings with notificationCheck sign-in patterns
Temporary contractorperson with time-limited key, on-demand keyGrant temporary access
Lost devicerevoke key, end sessions, reset factorRespond to a lost device
Review by auditorssign-in event, audit, change log, explanation of the policyTrace an access decision

Check a rule before enforcing it

An enforced sign-in rule takes effect as soon as it's saved. So check a new rule in trial mode:

  1. Create the rule with Mode = Report. It's judged at every sign-in but changes nothing.
  2. Use explain-sign-in for typical people and origins to work out what it would do (tried).
  3. Wait a few days of real operation and look in SignInRuleReports at how many sign-ins it would have hit, from how many people and origins. SignInEvents with contains(Rules,'"mode":"report"') finds the single sign-ins.
  4. If the result fits, switch the rule to Enforce; otherwise adjust conditions or exceptions and keep trying.

Details under Try a rule.

Create denials with save-sign-in-rule in one step together with their exceptions, so you don't lock yourself out between two changes (see sign-in).

en/wiki/data-conectivity/database-gateway/concepts/zero-trust-and-private-devices.txt · Zuletzt geändert: von Wolfgang van der Stille