Critical: These runbooks should be tested regularly!
Target audience: PKI Administrators, Security Team
Emergency procedures for CA failures, compromises, and recovery.
| Scenario | Description | RTO | RPO |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA Backup/Restore | Back up and restore CA keys | 4h | 24h |
| Key Ceremony | Secure key generation with controls | N/A | N/A |
| Emergency Revocation | Mass revocation on compromise | 1h | 0 |
| Severity | Example | First Response | Escalation |
| ———- | ——— | —————- | ———— |
| SEV-1 | CA key compromised | Emergency revocation | CISO, Mgmt |
| SEV-2 | CA server failed | Restore from backup | IT-Ops Lead |
| SEV-3 | Intermediate compromised | Revoke sub-CA | PKI Admin |
| SEV-4 | End-entity compromised | Single certificate | PKI Operator |
Keep emergency contacts current!
| Role | Name | Reachability |
| —— | —— | ————– |
| PKI Admin (Primary) | <Name> | Tel., Email |
| PKI Admin (Backup) | <Name> | Tel., Email |
| Security Team | security@example.com | 24/7 |
| HSM Vendor Support | <Vendor> | Support Hotline |
| Metric | Definition | Target |
| ——– | ———— | ——– |
| RTO | Recovery Time Objective - Max. time to recovery | 4h |
| RPO | Recovery Point Objective - Max. acceptable data loss | 24h |
| MTTR | Mean Time To Repair | < 2h |
« <- Operator Scenarios | -> CA Backup/Restore »
Wolfgang van der Stille @ EMSR DATA d.o.o. - Post-Quantum Cryptography Professional