Threat model and security aspects of post-quantum cryptography.
The Scenario:
Affected Algorithms:
Timeline:
Hybrid cryptography provides:
Hybrid Certificate: +-- RSA-4096 Signature (classical) +-- ML-DSA-65 Signature (PQ, in X.509 extension) Validation: +-- Legacy client: Verifies only RSA [check] +-- Modern client: Verifies RSA + ML-DSA [check][check]
CryptoMode.Hybrid as defaultusing statements for crypto objects%LOCALAPPDATA%\WvdS.Crypto\PqKeys\)| Limitation | Description | Workaround |
|---|---|---|
| Windows Store | No native PQ keys | Side-store is used |
| Argon2id | OpenSSL 3.6 experimental | Fallback to PBKDF2 |
| Custom OIDs | Not yet IANA-registered | Will be updated upon standardization |
| WASM Performance | 10-100x slower than native | Suitable for interactive use |
DLL Sideloading Risk: Ensure OpenSSL DLLs come from a trusted source and the path is correctly configured.
PQ Key Backup: The PQ key store is not included in Windows Certificate Store backup. Separate backup required!
Wolfgang van der Stille @ EMSR DATA d.o.o. - Post-Quantum Cryptography Professional