The WvdS Crypto Service implements several protection mechanisms that are automatically active. You don't need to configure anything.
Protects against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks through overload.
| Parameter | Value |
| Max Requests/Second | 1000 |
| Burst Tolerance | 100 |
| Cooldown | 100 ms |
Behavior when exceeded:
Request --> [Rate Limiter] --> Status: 0x07 (RATE_LIMITED)
--> No crypto operation performed
Client Recommendation:
int send_with_retry(const uint8_t* request, size_t len) { int retry = 0; int delay_ms = 100; while (retry < 5) { send_request(request, len); int status = get_response_status(); if (status != 0x07) return status; // Not rate-limited usleep(delay_ms * 1000); delay_ms *= 2; // Exponential backoff retry++; } return -1; // Timeout }
Nonce Reuse = Catastrophe
With AES-GCM, reusing a nonce leads to complete compromise of both plaintexts!
The Crypto Service actively protects against nonce reuse:
Note: Nonce tracking is per Key-ID. The tracker is reset on key rotation.
All inputs are validated before processing:
| Check | Error Code |
| Magic Byte != 0xC7 | 0x01 (INVALID_HEADER) |
| Unknown Request-Type | 0x02 (INVALID_TYPE) |
| Payload length wrong | 0x03 (INVALID_PAYLOAD) |
| Key-ID doesn't exist | 0x04 (KEY_NOT_FOUND) |
| Payload > 64 KB | 0x09 (PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE) |
No Exceptions:
The service doesn't throw exceptions. All errors are returned via status codes.
| Limit | 64 KB (65536 bytes) |
Reasons:
Encrypting large data:
// Chunked Encryption for large files #define CHUNK_SIZE (60 * 1024) // 60 KB per chunk int encrypt_large_file(FILE* in, FILE* out) { uint8_t buffer[CHUNK_SIZE]; size_t bytes_read; uint32_t chunk_id = 0; while ((bytes_read = fread(buffer, 1, CHUNK_SIZE, in)) > 0) { // AAD contains Chunk-ID for ordering protection char aad[32]; snprintf(aad, sizeof(aad), "chunk:%u", chunk_id++); uint8_t ct[CHUNK_SIZE + 28]; size_t ct_len; uint8_t nonce[12], tag[16]; encrypt_message(buffer, bytes_read, aad, strlen(aad), ct, &ct_len, nonce, tag); fwrite(nonce, 1, 12, out); fwrite(tag, 1, 16, out); fwrite(ct, 1, ct_len, out); } return 0; }
All security-critical data is overwritten after use:
Implementation:
// Prevent compiler optimization static void secure_zero(void* ptr, size_t len) { volatile uint8_t* p = (volatile uint8_t*)ptr; while (len--) *p++ = 0; }
The Crypto Service runs as an isolated L4Re task:
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ | L4Re Microkernel | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | +--+--+ +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ | | | Sigma0 | | Moe | | Crypto | | OEM | | | | (Root) | | (Mem) | | Service| | Gateway| | | +--------+ +-------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | | | | | +--------------+ | | ONLY this IPC | +---------------------------------------------------------------+
Security Guarantees:
| Symptom | Possible Cause | Solution |
| Status 0x04 persistent | Key storage corrupt | Regenerate keys |
| Status 0x07 frequent | Request rate too high | Batching, caching |
| Status 0x08 | Key rotation forgotten | Generate new key |
| Slow performance | FIPS mode + Debug | Use release build |
| Memory leak | Responses not processed | Clear shared memory |